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Cashback is Cash Forward: Delaying a Discount to Entice Future Spending 
 
ABSTRACT 
  
The authors examine purchase behavior in the context of cashback shopping—a novel 
form of price promotion online where consumers initiate transactions at the website of a 
cashback company and, after a significant delay, receive the savings promised to them. 
Specifically, they analyze panel data from a large cashback company and show that, independent 
of the predictable effect of cashback offers on initial demand, cashback payments (1) increase the 
probability that consumers make an additional purchase via the website of the cashback 
company, and (2) increase the size of that purchase. These effects pass several robustness 
checks. They are also meaningful: at the average values in the data an additional $1.00 in 
cashback payment increases the likelihood of a future transaction by 0.02% and spending by 
$0.32—figures that represent 10.03% of the overall impact of a given promotion. Moreover, we 
find that consumers are more likely to spend the money returned to them at generalists such as 
department stores than at other retailers. The authors consider three explanations for these 
findings, and the leading hypothesis is that consumers fail to treat money as a fungible resource. 
They also discuss implications for cashback companies and retailers. 
 
Keywords:  Cashback shopping, electronic commerce, sales promotion, pricing, mental 
accounting. 
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The continued growth of electronic commerce motivates firms to test new means of 
reaching and enticing consumers with better prices—anything from voucher codes to different 
models of daily deals and group buying. Within this context, cashback shopping is a relatively 
young but increasingly popular alternative. For example, Ebates, the leading cashback company 
in the United States, has processed cashback payments of over $800 million to more than 10 
million consumers since it began operating in 1998. In the United Kingdom, Quidco processed 
more than $64 million of cashback payments to its seven million registered users in 2016 alone, 
and facilitated sales of close to $1 billion for 4,300 retailers—a figure that represents 1% of all 
electronic commerce in the country for that year.1   
The feature that distinguishes cashback shopping from its peers is that consumers view 
cashback offers and initiate purchases at the website of the cashback company rather than 
directly with individual retailers. These offers are negotiated in advance with retailers and posted 
on the website typically as a percentage of money spent. The cashback company earns a 
commission on each transaction that eventuates and, upon receiving this commission, deposits 
cashback payments directly into the bank accounts of consumers. Importantly, the delay between 
a given purchase and the cashback payment is significant: a minimum of 30 days, but often as 
much as four months. 
We study data from a large cashback company to understand the impact of cashback 
payments on purchase behavior. The data comprise cashback offers, cashback payments, and 
                                                      
1  See https://www.ebates.com/help/article/company-overview-115009254588 and 
https://www.quidco.com/business/about/, both accessed on November 1, 2017. 
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individual purchases over a period greater than eight years. Two results stand out. First, cashback 
payments increase the probability that consumers make an additional purchase via the website of 
the cashback company. Second, cashback payments increase the size of that purchase. These 
effects pass several robustness checks. They are also meaningful: at the average values in the 
data an additional $1.00 in cashback increases the likelihood of a future transaction by 0.02% 
and spending by $0.32—figures that represent 10.03% of the overall impact of a given 
promotion. Notably, the impact of cashback payments is separate from that of cashback offers on 
initial demand—that is, although consumers may already respond positively to cashback offers, 
they again respond positively to cashback payments. 
An interesting finding is that cashback payments impact purchase behavior differently 
depending on the type of retailer and consumers are more likely to spend the money returned to 
them at generalists such as department stores than at other retailers. This insight has implications 
for the design of cashback promotions (which are pertinent to cashback companies) and the logic 
of participating in such initiatives (which are pertinent to retailers). A more fundamental point, 
however, is that any such practical advice is beneficial to the extent that the relevant players are 
conscious of the influence of cashback payments. The following quote from the managing 
director of the cashback company that facilitated the data suggests that this may not be the case: 
“We spend a lot of time designing offers that are profitable for retailers and give our users 
maximum value. Of course, an essential part of our work is to ensure they receive the payments 
they are promised, but we have never spent time looking at what the repercussions of these 
payments may be.” 
From the standpoint of the literature, our first goal is to bridge the gap between the 
growing use of cashback shopping and the understanding of the phenomenon. Our research adds 
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empirical evidence to studies that are predominantly analytical in nature (Chen et al. 2008; Ho, 
Ho, and Tan 2017; Zhou et al. 2017). To our knowledge, the only other empirical study on the 
subject focuses on the relationship between the size and composition of a user’s network, and the 
extent and pattern of navigation at the cashback company’s website (Ballestar, Grau-Carles, and 
Sainz 2016). In contrast, we question how consumers react to cashback offers and payments. The 
idea that consumers are susceptible to not only the promise of a saving, but also the later 
payment of that saving is striking because they are free to spend or save this money in any way 
they deem fit. We consider the possibility that consumers fail to treat cashback payments as a 
fungible resource, and also that cashback payments act as a scheduling mechanism or prompt 
some transient state that then affects purchases. The data lend support to the first hypothesis. 
Beyond this, we see two contributions. First, we add to research on price promotions 
online, which to date has focused on instances of group buying (Wu, Shi, and Hu 2014) or daily 
deals (Aydinli, Bertini, and Lambrecht 2014; Luo et al. 2014). Second, we complement articles 
that question the logic of delayed discounts. These studies examine the psychology that underlies 
redemption behavior (Gilpatric 2009; Soman 1998) or the economics of tying the payment of a 
saving to a second purchase (Raju, Dhar, and Morrison 1994; Dhar, Morrison, and Raju 1996). 
Although we describe a setting where low redemption and forced purchases are irrelevant 
(cashback payments are automatic and unconditional), we find that delaying a discount is still 
beneficial.  
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EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 
The Data 
A nondisclosure agreement prevents us from revealing the name of the cashback 
company that shared the data, the geography where it operates, or the local currency. For ease of 
exposition, we convert all monetary values into United States Dollars. The data spans May 2005 
(when the firm started operating) to August 2013. We have information on every purchase by a 
sample of 76,296 registered users (consumers) of the cashback company in response to every 
cashback offer, and the corresponding cashback payments.2 We observe 3,433,476 transactions 
by these consumers at 5,337 retailers. Consumers registered with the cashback company at 
different points in time and thereafter received emails promoting current cashback offers. The 
demographic information for a subset of consumers suggests that they are representative of the 
overall population, albeit somewhat younger and disproportionately male.  
Consumers face no restrictions on the number or timing of purchases. We observe the 
total amount spent by a consumer on a given day, at a given retailer, and for a cashback offer of a 
given size. We do not observe details such as the type, category, or quantity of the item(s) 
purchased. If a retailer advertised multiple cashback offers on a given day, and a consumer acted 
on more than one of these offers, then these are recorded as separate purchases in the data.  
Table 1 provides summary statistics. The average tenure of a consumer, measured as the 
time between the first and last purchase, is 876.8 days. On average, a consumer made 45.0 
                                                      
2  We do not observe purchases that are independent of a cashback offer or initiated directly with a 
retailer. A small (4.80%) set of transactions relates to cashback offers available at the physical 
premises of a retailer. These are excluded from the analysis, but included in a robustness check.  
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purchases on 36.9 days, each worth $305.66, and received a cashback payment on 12.4 days, 
each worth $51.44.3 The mean time between successive purchase days is 24.4 days. The mean 
time between purchase and cashback payment is 123.9 days, with a standard deviation of 110.9 
days (Figure 1). 
----------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
One reason for the size and variability of the delay between purchases and cashback 
payments is that retailers process commissions to the cashback company only after the return 
period for the item(s) in question expires. Return periods vary across retailers according to 
regulations, policies, and routines. In turn, the cashback company seldom executes a cashback 
payment before receiving the corresponding commission, and its own processes are subject to 
delays. A second reason is that the cashback company enters into different agreements with 
different retailers, often as a function of the product category.  
Identification Strategy 
Our ability to identify the causal effects of cashback payments on purchase behavior rests 
on the assumption that their timing and size are exogenous from the standpoint of consumers. 
That is, consumers should not be able to predict or influence cashback payments, otherwise they 
can adjust their spending plans. 
                                                      
3  The cashback company typically makes a single cashback payment within a seven-day stretch. Within 
this period, if the cashback company receives more than one commission from retailers pertaining to 
the same consumer, then it aggregates payments into a single bank transfer (irrespective of amount, 
type of purchase, or type of retailer). 
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There are four justifications for this claim. First, the cashback company schedules 
cashback payments according to the aforementioned internal process, not some strategic 
consideration. Second, consumers are notified of a deposit only once it is executed. Third, there 
is considerable irregularity in the time retailers take to pay commissions, and in the time the 
cashback company takes to execute cashback payments: the coefficient of variation of delay in 
the data is 0.89. There is also significant variation in the interval between purchases and 
cashback payments at the level of a single consumer (Figure 2), countering the possibility that 
the pattern in Figure 1 arises from differences between individuals. Similarly, the interval varies 
at the level of a retailer, as Figure 3 demonstrates for four retailers selected at random. Figure 5 
shows such variation for the purchases at a single generalist retailer for four consumers selected 
at random but unmatched on any other variables while Figure 5 shows this variation among four 
consumers matched by gender, age, and spending.4 Fourth,  
Figure 6 displays the delay for a generalist (offering a broad range of products) and a 
specialist (offering a narrow range), suggesting that the delay is not specific to the range of 
products offered.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2-6 about here 
------------------------------------- 
One concern is that the delay between purchases and cashback payments varies with the 
size of the former. This would be the case if, say, more expensive products enjoy longer return 
                                                      
4  These consumers are the modal gender at the retailer (female), have the median age (35 to 44), are 
within one standard deviation of the median expenditure per transaction at the retailer, and are within 
one standard deviation of the median expenditure across all retailers in the data.  
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periods, and consumers know this. However, our conversations with executives at the cashback 
company suggest that no such relationship exists, and the data indicate a low correlation between 
the size of a purchase or cashback payment and the delay in the data: R2 = -0.015, p < 0.001 and 
R2 = -0.016, p < 0.001, respectively.  
A second concern is that the nature of certain purchases improves the ability of 
consumers to predict cashback payments. An example is travel, where consumers may infer that 
a service provider safeguards against cancelations by processing cashback payments only after 
the event (a flight, hotel stay, etc.) takes place. This scenario affects a small subset of 
transactions, and even then consumers cannot pinpoint the date of payments. Irrespective, one of 
our robustness checks excludes observations with long delays. The Web Appendix, Section 1, 
reports further evidence that consumers are unlikely to predict the timing of cashback payments. 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Model-Free Evidence 
We explore the possibility of relationships between cashback payments and purchase 
likelihood, and between cashback payments and spending. With respect to purchase likelihood, 
we classify every consumer-day observation as a “purchase” or “non-purchase” event depending 
on whether the consumer transacted at least once through the cashback company on that day. We 
then compute the average cashback payment received in the seven days prior. The pattern in 
Figure 7 suggests that cashback payments affect purchase likelihood: on average, consumers 
receive $2.50 more in the seven days prior to a purchase event than prior to a non-purchase event 
(p < 0.001). 
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
--------------------------------- 
With respect to spending, we associate the cashback paid to a consumer in periods of 
seven days (from a given Saturday to the next Friday) to the money spent by the same consumer 
in the following seven days. We use this interval because the cashback company processes 
51.5% of deposits on a Thursday or Friday (the results hold for alternative specifications). For 
each amount of cashback payment, we calculate the average weekly spend across all consumer-
week observations. We then correlate the level of cashback payment and the average weekly 
spend. Figure 8 indicates a positive relationship: as cashback increases, so does spending—the 
correlation is 0.332 (p < 0.001). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
--------------------------------- 
These initial analyses clearly do not control for consumer heterogeneity, which matters 
because consumers who purchase frequently are more likely to receive cashback payments than 
consumers who purchase infrequently. Similarly, consumers who make large purchases—and are 
likely to do so in the future—receive larger cashback payments than consumers who do not. We 
next turn to this concern.   
Cashback Payments and Purchase Likelihood 
Model setup. We use a semi-parametric, proportional hazard model to estimate whether, 
on any given day, the cashback payment received by a consumer in the seven days prior 
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increases the probability of a purchase via the cashback company on that day.5 We model a 
consumer’s purchase decision from the first transaction observed in the data to the last. 
In a proportional hazard model, the dependent variable T represents the time (in days) 
between two consecutive purchase days. We model the hazard of a purchase by consumer i on 
any given day t, hi(t|Xit), as  
																																																							݄௜ሺݐ| ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൌ ݄଴௜ሺݐሻ expሺ ௜ܺ௧ߚሻ																																																													ሺ1ሻ 
Here, h0i(t) is the baseline hazard function specific to consumer i. To account for 
individual differences, we take a stratified baseline approach and let the baseline hazard function 
vary non-parametrically across consumers (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978). The baseline hazard is 
shifted proportionally by exp(Xitβ), where Xit is a vector of time-varying covariates. We specify 
the vector of covariates as: 
																	 ௜ܺ௧ߚ ൌ ߚଵ ෍ ܥܤܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜,௞
௧ି଻
௞ୀ௧ିଵ
൅ߚଶܣݒ݃ܥܤܱ݂݂݁ݎ௧ ൅ ߚଷܮܽݏݐܲݑݎ݄ܿܽݏ݁ܵ݌݁݊݀௜௧ 		
൅ ߚସܲݑݎ݄ܿܽݏ݁ܫ݊ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௧ ൅ ߚହܦܽݕܱ݂ܹ݁݁݇௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܯ݋݊ݐ݄௧																																	ሺ2ሻ 
The independent variable of interest is ∑ ܥܤܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜,௞௧ି଻௞ୀ௧ିଵ : the cashback paid to 
consumer i in the seven days prior to day t. We control for the size of cashback offers advertised 
on day t by taking the average percentage of the offers from the 10 largest retailers by number of 
transactions, AvgCBOffert. Note that the effects of ∑ ܥܤܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜,௞௧ି଻௞ୀ௧ିଵ  and AvgCBOffert can 
be identified simultaneously because the amount of cashback payment is determined not only by 
the cashback offer, but also the amount a consumer spends, which results in significant variation 
                                                      
5 One alternative is to take a weekly (rather than daily) specification. Given that the median inter-
purchase interval is eight days, this option removes significant variation.  
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in the size of cashback payments related to the same offer. The variable LastPurchaseSpendit 
captures the amount spent by consumer i on the most recent purchase day, and therefore it 
controls for consumer-specific purchase trends. PurchaseInstanceit, the number of transactions 
made by consumer i up to but not including day t, controls for prior experience with the cashback 
company. DayOfWeekt and Montht control for day-of-week and month fixed effects. 
Results. Column (I) of Table 2 shows that larger cashback payments increase purchase 
likelihood. The associated hazard rate of 1.0002 implies that, on any given day, an additional 
$1.00 in cashback in the seven days prior raises the probability of purchase by 0.02%. Columns 
(II) and (III) measure the effect separately by terciles (< $8.10, ≥ $8.10 and < $35.20, ≥ $35.20) 
and quintiles (<$4.86, ≥$4.86 and <$11.34, ≥$11.34 and < $27.54, ≥$27.54 and <$69.66, 
≥69.66), demonstrating that this $1.00 increment has a stronger impact on purchase likelihood 
when the cashback payment is small—in other words, the marginal effect of cashback payments 
decreases as their size increases.6 Column (IV) shows that the result holds when we specify a 
frailty model with a gamma-distributed random effect to account for consumer heterogeneity 
rather than taking the stratified baseline approach (McGilchrist and Aisbett 1991). While in the 
initial specification the baseline hazard varied non-parametrically across consumers, the frailty 
model assumes a multiplicative effect of the heterogeneity parameter on the baseline hazard 
function. Finally, Column (V) shows that the results are robust to using a post-hoc consumer-
specific cashback offer variable reflecting only offers by retailers where a consumer shopped in 
the past. 
--------------------------------- 
                                                      
6  Because the data contain many days where consumers receive no cashback payments, we cannot use 
alternative specifications such as a log function or a quadratic term. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
With respect to the remaining covariates, we find that purchase likelihood decreases with 
the number of past purchases, which is consistent with studies on consumer attrition over time 
(Fader, Hardie, and Shang 2010). Similarly, consumers who recently spent large amounts are 
more likely to purchase. In line with broader evidence, the size of cashback offers has a positive 
effect on purchase likelihood.  
Cashback Payments and Spending 
Model setup. We use a Type-I Tobit specification to estimate the effect of cashback 
payments in a given week (from a Saturday to the next Friday) on spending at any time in the 
following seven days. The analysis is at the weekly rather than daily level because the latter 
yields a large number of null (zero-spend) observations per consumer. For consumer i in week w, 
Spendiw is the observed weekly expenditure, ܮܽݐܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪∗  is the unobserved latent dependent 
variable, and ௜ܺ௪ is the observed vector of independent covariates. We specify the dependent 
variable as log	ሺܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪ ൅ 1ሻ rather than Spendiw because of the significant mass of 
observations in the right tail of spending. Specifically, we estimate:  
																																																ܮܽݐܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪∗ ൌ ௜ܺ௪ߚ ൅ ߝ௜௪, 				ߝ௜௪~ܰሾ0, ߪఌଶሿ																																									ሺ3ሻ 
																												log	ሺܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪ ൅ 1 ൌ ൜ܮܽݐܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪
∗ 		݂݅	ܮܽݐܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪∗ ൐ 0
	0																					݂݅	ܮܽݐܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪∗ ൑ 0 																																							ሺ4ሻ 
The vector of covariates is: 
													 ௜ܺ௪ߚ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ߚଵܥܤܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ௜,௪ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܣݒ݃ܥܤܱ݂݂݁ݎ௪ ൅ ߚଷܮܽݏݐܲݑݎ݄ܿܽݏ݁ܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪
൅ ߚସܲݑݎ݄ܿܽݏ݁ܫ݊ݏݐܽ݊ܿ݁௜௪ ൅ ߚହܯ݋݊ݐ݄௪ ൅ ߝ௜௪																																																								ሺ5ሻ 
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The independent variable of interest is CBPaymenti,w-1: the amount of cashback received 
by consumer i in the week prior to week w. We control for the size of cashback offers advertised 
in week w by taking the average percentage of cashback offered by the 10 largest retailers, 
AvgCBOfferw. The variable LastPurchaseSpendiw captures the amount spent by consumer i in the 
most recent week with a purchase. PurchaseInstanceiw is the number of transactions made by 
consumer i up to but not including week w. Monthw controls for month fixed effects. 
Consumer-specific random effects, αi, are distributed ߙ௜~ܰሾ0, ߪఔଶሿ and account for 
heterogeneity in the average weekly spending level. The likelihood function for the Tobit model 
must be integrated over the distribution of ߙ௜, which is computationally intensive as integrating 
over the normal distribution does not yield closed-form expressions and the likelihood is 
estimated numerically. As such, for all Tobit analyses we randomly select 5,000 consumers. To 
provide evidence that the findings generalize to the full sample, we also estimate an OLS 
specification using the full sample. Finally, εiw is an IID Normal error term. 
Results. Column (I) in Table 3 reports the OLS specification using the full sample, where 
the dependent variable is the weekly amount spent. The effect of cashback payments is 
significant and positive. Column (II) displays the result of the Tobit specification. Again, the 
money spent by consumers in any given week increases with cashback payments received in the 
seven days prior.7 With respect to the other covariates, we find the expected positive effect of 
                                                      
7  A reasonable question is whether cashback earned but not yet received affects spending. The problem 
with such a variable is that it is not exogenous to consumers. Assume that a consumer purchases at 
time t1 and considers a purchase at a later time t2 before receiving the cashback payment associated 
with the purchase at t1. When deciding how much to spend, the consumer has a sense of “cashback 
earned but not yet received” in t2, as it depends on the purchase in t1. As the consumer can use this 
knowledge to make adjustments, it is difficult to make a causal claim. (Even so, we find that cashback 
payments impact spending when we add this control.) 
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cashback offers on spending. Similarly, we find that purchase instance has a positive effect on 
amount spent, consistent with the pattern observed in Fader, Hardie, and Lee (2005). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Next, we examine whether the effect of cashback payments on spending is sensitive to 
the size of cashback payments. Columns (III) and (IV) show that this is the case when we take 
cashback payments by tercile or quintile: an increase in cashback payment by $1.00 has a greater 
effect on spending when that payment is small rather than large. Column (V) shows that the 
results hold when using a consumer-specific cashback offer variable.  
We also evaluate the size of the effect of cashback payments on spending based on 
estimates from Column (III). We consider the marginal effect of increasing the cashback 
payment by $1.00 on the weekly spend as: 
																																																			డ୪୭୥	ሺௌ௣௘௡ௗ೔ೢାଵሻడ஼஻௉௔௬௠௘௡௧೔ ൌ ߚଵ઴ቀ
௑೔ೢఉ
ఙഄ ቁ																																																		ሺ6ሻ                          
Figure 9 plots this effect at the median level of cashback payment in each tercile ($3.24, $17.82, 
and $81.00). The x-axis reflects the amount spent (ܵ݌݁݊݀௜௪). For each amount, the y-axis 
reflects the change in spending that would result from the additional $1.00. At the mean spend of 
$69.34 and the median cashback payment of $17.82, the marginal effect of such an increase is 
$0.32. Note again that this result is independent of the impact of cashback offers on initial 
demand, and that the magnitude of the marginal effect declines with the tercile level of payment: 
at the same weekly spend of $69.34, increasing by $1.00 a cashback payment of $3.24 
contributes $0.58 in further spending. The Web Appendix, Section 2, provides more detail on the 
effect of cashback payments on spending.  
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Finally, we compare the effect of cashback payments on spending to the effect of 
cashback offers on initial demand. Note that the marginal effects from the Tobit model refer to 
increases in cashback offers by 1 percentage point and in cashback payments by $1.00. We 
conclude that, at the average values in the data, the effect of cashback payments accounts for 
about 10.03% of the overall effect of the promotion (see Web Appendix, Section 3). 
Robustness Checks 
We complete several checks to ensure the robustness of our findings.8 First, note that the 
independent variable to this point is the amount of cashback payment received by a consumer in 
the prior week. We test whether the results in Column (II) of Table 3 replicate for an interval of 
14 or 28 days. Columns (I) and (II) in Table 4 show that this is the case.  
Second, recall that the argument of causality hinges on the assumption that cashback 
payments are exogenous to consumers. The initial analysis supports this idea, but we pointed to a 
subset of purchases (e.g., travel expenses) for which consumers may have a better sense of the 
timing of cashback payments. To check this possibility, we estimate the model excluding 
consumer-week observations with delays exceeding the mean plus one standard deviation. 
Column (III) in Table 4 replicates the main findings. 
Third, we want to know whether the effects of cashback payments are due to the sum 
paid rather than the mere act of receiving money. For instance, the emails sent by the cashback 
                                                      
8  These checks apply to purchase likelihood and spending. As the results are similar, we report only 
those that pertain to spending. The Web Appendix, Section 4, reports the remainder. 
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company to notify consumers of a deposit may drive traffic to the website of the cashback 
company, which in turn impacts spending. Column (IV) shows that the results hold using only 
the consumer-week observations in which cashback payments are greater than zero. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Extensions 
We consider three extensions. First, we ask whether the delay between purchases and 
cashback payments moderates the effect that the latter has on spending. Column (V) of Table 4 
reports separate coefficients for cashback payments depending on whether the corresponding 
delay is in the lower, middle, or upper tercile. Cashback payments have a stronger effect on 
spending when delays are short, and a weaker effect when delays are long. That is, despite the 
fact that some lag is necessary to induce and increase future spending through the cashback 
company, it appears that the greater the lag, the lower the effect—perhaps because excessive 
delays cause frustration. In the Web Appendix, Section 5, we consider whether consumers 
respond to perceived rather than absolute delays, and find similar results. 
Second, we check for patterns that suggest consumers learn to predict the delay between 
purchases and the corresponding cashback payments. The results reported in the Web Appendix, 
Section 5, demonstrate that such learning is unlikely. 
Third, we ask whether our results replicate for different categories of retailers. These 
categories are defined by the cashback company. Table 5 covers the four largest categories in the 
data. The outcome variable is spending in a particular retailer category. We estimate the effect of 
cashback payments separately when these originate from retailers in the same or different 
     
17 
 
categories. Column (I) shows that cashback payments from generalists (mostly department 
stores) affect spending with generalists more than they do with other (more specialized) retailers. 
The results in Column (II), which relate to travel, are similar but significant only at the 90% 
confidence level. This may be because in this category consumers purchase infrequently, or 
because travel products tend to be expensive and time consuming. Columns (III) and (IV) relate 
to subscription services—mostly utilities and insurance in the first case, mostly magazines in the 
second. Here, a purchase typically implies a contractual obligation for at least one year. The 
negative relationship between cashback payments and spending may be because those who 
recently subscribed to a service are less likely to do so again in the near future. Finally, although 
the number of transactions by individual consumers with individual retailers is mostly low, we 
estimate a model for the largest generalist (by number of transactions). Column (V) demonstrates 
that the effect of cashback payments on spending is significantly higher for the same retailer than 
it is for other retailers, suggesting that the results in Column (I) hold even at the level of a single 
retailer. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------- 
 
BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATIONS: INITIAL EVIDENCE 
 
Money Is Not Fungible 
A basic premise in research on mental accounting is that individuals decompose wealth 
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into categories, including “current assets,” where the temptation to spend is low, and “current 
income,” where the temptation to spend is high (Shefrin and Thaler 1988). In addition, people 
code small windfalls as current income, and tend to match the source of this income with its use. 
For example, Kooreman (2000) found that government payments labeled as child benefits 
increased spending on children clothing, and Milkman and Beshears (2009) found that patrons of 
a grocery store spent more at that store when redeeming an unexpected coupon than when they 
did not. Closer to our interest, Reinholtz, Bartels, and Parker (2015) showed that consumers 
perceive funds that are specific to a retailer as an account governed by the goal to purchase from 
the same retailer. 
These arguments are relevant to our context if one accepts that consumers (a) segregate 
cashback payments from purchases, and (b) perceive the former as windfalls—a possibility 
raised by Soman (1998) in the context of mail-in rebates but never tested empirically. If true, 
then the implication is precisely that consumers spend cashback payments via the cashback 
company. Moreover, Shefrin and Thaler (1988) stressed that people spend windfalls to the extent 
that they appear small, meaningless changes in one’s wealth. As windfalls grow, they are more 
likely to be seen instead as assets and, therefore, more likely to be saved. 
Consistent with this logic, Columns (II) and (III) of Table 2 and Columns (III) and (IV) 
of Table 3 report an inverse relationship between the marginal effect of cashback payments on 
purchase likelihood as well as spending, respectively. However, the data do not tell us whether 
the money returned to consumers is spent elsewhere or saved. To address this limitation, we 
surveyed 441 individuals on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Respondents first read 
general information regarding cashback shopping. They then faced seven different cashback 
payments ($3, $7, $18, $54, $113, $162, $287) in random order and split each sum into saving 
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and spending.9 We examine whether the money allocated to saving varies with the size of the 
cashback payment. Column (I) of Table 6 is an OLS specification, and it shows that the 
percentage of cashback payment saved increases in the size of the cashback payment after 
controlling for income, age, gender, and participant fixed-effects. Given the nature of the 
dependent variable, Column (II) reports a fractional logit specification as a robustness check 
(Papke and Wooldridge 1996). The Web Appendix, Section 6, provides more detail on the 
stimulus and Section 7 adds to the analysis. Overall, the result of this survey adds support to the 
idea that the effects of cashback payments can be traced to a process of mental accounting.  
Cashback Payments Are a Scheduling Device 
A second explanation is that consumers use cashback payments to schedule future 
purchases. One motivation for this can be financial: consumers with liquidity problems postpone 
spending until they receive cashback payments and have more money at hand. However, the 
evidence presented to this point suggests that consumers cannot predict with reasonable accuracy 
the timing of cashback payments. Notwithstanding, assume that consumers engage in scheduling 
and receive a salary at the end of each calendar month. If this were the case, then the effect of 
cashback payments on spending should be more (less) pronounced at the end (beginning) of a 
given month. Column (I) of Table 7 displays results for cashback payments executed during the 
first week of a given month, or at any other time. There are no significant differences across the 
two estimations. Similarly, in Column (II) we find no significant differences between the last 
week and any other time in a month.  
-------------------------------- 
                                                      
9  The cashback payments correspond to the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 95th, and 99th percentile of 
cashback payments in the data, rounded to the nearest whole number.   
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Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------- 
A different motivation is self-control. Suppose that people tend toward immediate 
gratification, but understand that deferring a purchase can improve the quality of the decision or 
make the purchase more pleasurable (Caplin and Leahy 2001; Hoch and Loewenstein 1991). One 
way to exercise patience is to tie future purchases to cashback payments, but again the data show 
no such evidence. While the average interval between successive purchases is 24.4 days, it is 
56.1 days in the case of successive cashback payments. The average delay between purchases 
and cashback payments is 123.9 days. Therefore, consumers make 5.08 purchases between a 
given purchase and the associated cashback payment, and make 2.21 purchases between 
successive cashback payments. 
Moreover, note that the incidence of cashback payments varies across consumers. 
Consumers who purchase more frequently experience a shorter delay between successive 
cashback payments, which makes self-control less relevant. As such, the effect of cashback 
payments on spending should be weaker for this group. Column (III) of Table 7 compares 
consumers across three groups that differ in purchase frequency: <19.08 days between purchases, 
≥42.68 days, or anytime in between. Column (IV) does the same using quintiles. Contrary to the 
idea of self-control, the effect of cashback payments is stronger for consumers who purchase 
more frequently. The results are not significant for the first group, those who purchase 
infrequently, probably because the estimation contains many cashback payments and spending 
levels with a value of zero.   
Cashback Payments Prompt a Transient State 
The third explanation is that cashback payments trigger some transient state. For 
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example, it is possible that cashback payments elevate one’s mood, or that consumers perceive 
them as acts of kindness and reciprocate by spending through the cashback company (Heilman, 
Nakamoto, and Rao 2002; Rabin 1993). It is also possible that the emails notifying consumers of 
cashback payments make shopping through the cashback company more salient (Obermiller 
1985). Irrespective, the hypothesis is that cashback payments prompt a temporary effect that, in 
turn, increases the propensities to purchase and spend.  
While the data do not allow us to confirm or rule out these related explanations, the last 
two accounts predict a positive, or at best null, relationship between the size of a cashback 
payment and its marginal effect on spending. The inverse relationship in Columns (II) and (III) 
of Table 2, and in Columns (III) and (IV) of Table 3 suggests that other mechanisms such as 
mental accounting are at play. 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
 
We study how cashback payments impact consumer purchase behavior. We have two 
main results. First, cashback payments shorten the time consumers take to make additional 
purchases via the website of the cashback company. Second, cashback payments increase the 
size of these purchases. Specifically, at the average values in the data, increasing cashback 
payment by $1.00 increases the probability of a new transaction by 0.02% and spending by 
$0.32. These figures represent 10.03% of the overall impact of a given promotion.  
The finding that consumers are susceptible not only to the promise of a saving  but also to 
the later payment of that saving is surprising because they are free to spend the money in any 
manner or, indeed, to set it aside. It is also surprising if one considers that cashback payments are 
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trivial within the context of lifetime income—they should not influence purchase behavior in any 
product category, with any retailer, or through any intermediary in a meaningful way. 
Irrespective, one possible explanation is that consumers ultimately fail to treat money as a 
fungible resource. The data lend support to this argument: we observe an inverse relationship 
between the size of cashback payments and their marginal effect on spending. Other possible 
explanations are that cashback payments act as a scheduling mechanism or prompt some 
transient state, but for both we find little support in the data.  
With this in mind, our research is relevant given Hastings and Shapiro’s (2013) call for 
more evidence of mental accounting “in the wild.” Our work is perhaps closest to that of 
Milkman and Beshears (2009), although in reality the comparison ends at the fact that we both 
construe discounts as windfalls. First, we examine the effect of discounts that are delayed and 
conditional on a prior purchase, not standard “dollars-off” coupons. Second, cashback payments 
have no usage or time restrictions. This is important because consumers spend (again) via the 
cashback company money that, at least in principle, is fully fungible. Third, consumers respond 
to multiple offers of varying amounts, not a single offer of a fixed amount. This allows us to test 
whether the size of the windfall matters to the extent predicted by mental accounting. Finally, the 
data span many product categories and retailers, a large number of consumers, and eight years of 
purchases and cashback payments. 
Because the interval between purchases and cashback payments rarely falls below 30 
days in the data (and in cashback shopping in general), we cannot make recommendations 
regarding optimal delays. Future research could address this constraint by implementing 
experiments that vary the delay, either in the field on in the laboratory. Moreover, while the data 
provide insight into possible behavioral mechanisms, we do not have direct process evidence. 
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Again, further studies can take up this challenge by testing specific mediating variables and their 
logical moderators.  
Notwithstanding, the fact that cashback shopping stimulates demand at two different 
points in time has practical implications. First, it matters to cashback companies, which appear 
largely unaware of the effects of cashback payments. The analysis suggests that cashback 
companies can increase revenue by designing promotions to not only attract an initial purchase, 
but also stimulate future purchases. In addition, consumers appear more likely to spend the 
money returned to them at generalist retailers such as department stores, and less likely to do so 
in categories such as travel and subscription-based services, which implies that the selection of 
participating retailers is important. Finally, if mental accounting explains the psychology of 
consumers, then cashback companies need to emphasize their link to cashback payments. For 
example, the emails that notify consumers of recent cashback payments should stress that the 
cashback company is responsible for the deposit and which retailer funded the payment, with the 
intent of increasing the probability of a future purchase.  
Second, it matters to retailers. Understanding the dual effect of cashback offers and 
cashback payments is useful to assess the full benefits and costs of collaborating with a cashback 
company—focusing solely on the ability of cashback offers to generate demand underestimates 
the full potential. It can also help to make smarter decisions about the timing of cashback 
payments, as it may be beneficial to execute commissions quickly and, in turn, insist that the 
cashback company does the same with cashback payments. Finally, while it is not 
straightforward to compare the effectiveness of different forms of price promotion across studies 
(as these may focus on different customer segments, product categories, geographies, etc.), we 
find that the effectiveness of cashback shopping is broadly similar to that of other established 
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online and offline methods of price promotion (Web Appendix, Section 8). This suggests that an 
individual retailer planning to use price promotions may benefit from considering—and 
potentially testing—a wide range of options including cashback shopping, daily deals, and e-mail 
coupons. 
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Table 1: SUMMARY OF DATA ACROSS CONSUMERS 
Variable Mean SD 
Across consumers   
Number of transactions 44.9997 99.1416 
Number of transactions days 36.8435 58.7409 
Number of transaction weeks 27.0091 34.5744 
Amount spent per transaction ($) 305.6598 396.2032 
Amount spent per day ($), days with at least one transaction 339.6962 428.2690 
Amount spent per week ($), weeks with at least one transaction 389.0472 480.3486 
Number of cashback payments 29.5141 60.6436 
Number of days with at least one cashback payment 12.4130 14.1282 
Number of weeks with at least one cashback payment 11.0970 15.5075 
Cashback payment per deposit ($) 25.3925 29.4263 
Cashback payment per day with deposit > 0 ($) 51.4399 54.0315 
Cashback payment per week with deposit > 0 ($) 52.1265 54.4228 
Tenure with cashback company (days) 876.8391 717.8193 
Across purchases   
Inter-purchase time (days) 24.3582 61.5523 
Across cashback payments   
Interval between purchase and payment of cashback (days) 123.8624 110.9093 
Cashback payment per week ($) 42.2606 74.3290 
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Table 2: CASHBACK PAYMENTS AND PURCHASE LIKELIHOOD 
  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Dependent variable Linear specification of cashback payment 
Tercile split specification of 
cashback payment 
Quintile split specification of 
cashback payment Frailty model 
Consumer-specific 
cashback offer size 
Time to next purchase (in days) Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE  
Independent variables                
Cashback payment ($) 0.0002 0.0000 ***       0.0006 0.0002 *** 0.0006 0.0002 *** 
Cashback payment in the lower tercile (< $8.10)    0.0035 0.0006 ***          
Cashback payment in the middle tercile  
(≥ $8.10 to < $35.20)    0.0018 0.0001 ***          
Cashback payment in the higher tercile (≥ $35.20)    0.0002 0.0000 ***          
Cashback payment in the first quintile (< $4.86)       0.0032 0.0010 ***       
Cashback payment in the second quintile  
(≥ $4.86 to < $11.34)       0.0037 0.0004 ***       
Cashback payment in the third quintile  
(≥ $11.34 to < $27.54)       0.0022 0.0002 ***       
Cashback payment in the fourth quintile 
(≥ $27.54 to < $69.66)       0.0012 0.0001 ***       
Cashback payment in the fifth quintile (≥ $69.66)       0.0002 0.0000 ***       
Average cashback offer (%) of top 10 retailers in 
the current week 0.0335 0.0015 *** 0.0339 0.0015 *** 0.0341 0.0015 *** 0.0386 0.0131 ***    
Average cashback offer (%) in the current week of 
retailers specific to a consumer             0.0442 0.0083 *** 
Amount spent in the most recent purchase ($) 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 *** 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Purchase instance -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0002 0.0001 ** 0.0003 0.0001 ** 
Consumer heterogeneity Stratified baseline   
Stratified 
baseline   
Stratified 
baseline   
Gamma 
frailty   
Stratified 
baseline   
Day of week fixed effect  Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Month fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Number of consumers 76,296   76,296   76,296   1,000   1,000   
N  66,908,111   66,908,111   66,908,111   873,119   873,119   
LL -9,553,060   -9,552,958   -9,552,883   -327,586   -119,030   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 0.01                
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Table 3: CASHBACK PAYMENTS AND SPENDING 
  (I)  (II)  (III)  (IV) (V) 
Dependent variable 
OLS: Linear 
specification of 
cashback payment 
 Tobit: Linear specification of 
cashback payment 
 Tobit: Tercile split specification of cashback 
payment 
Tobit: Quintile split 
specification of cashback 
payment 
Tobit: Consumer-specific 
cashback offer size 
Log (Amount spent in the week ($)) Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE  
Independent variables                
Cashback payment ($) 0.0007 0.0001 *** 0.0025 0.0004 ***       .0024 0.0004 *** 
Cashback payment in the lower tercile (< $8.10)       0.0346 0.0121 ***       
Cashback payment in the middle tercile  
(≥ $8.10 to < $35.20)       0.0184 0.0028 ***    
   
Cashback payment in the higher tercile (≥ $35.20)       0.0023 0.0004 ***       
Cashback payment in the first quintile (< $4.86)          0.0234 0.0209     
Cashback payment in the second quintile  
(≥ $4.86 to < $11.34)          0.0291 0.0090 *** 
   
Cashback payment in the third quintile  
(≥ $11.34 to < $27.54)          0.0204 0.0038 *** 
   
Cashback payment in the fourth quintile 
(≥ $27.54 to < $69.66)          0.0077 0.0017 *** 
   
Cashback payment in the fifth quintile (≥ $69.66)          0.0021 0.0004 ***    
Average cashback offer (%) of top 10 retailers in the 
current week 0.0352 0.0020 *** 0.1662 0.0346 *** 0.1672 0.0346 *** 0.1676 0.0346 ***    
Average cashback offer (%) in the current week of 
retailers specific to a consumer              0.1268 0.0091 *** 
Amount spent in the most recent purchase ($) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Purchase instance 0.0002 0.0001 *** 0.0027 0.0003 *** 0.0026 0.0003 *** 0.0026 0.0003 *** 0.0042 0.0002 *** 
Consumer heterogeneity FE   RE   RE   RE   RE   
Month fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Number of consumers 76,296   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   
N 9,620,542   640,784   640,784   640,784   640,784   
LL       -621669.78   -621650.87   -621650.09   -623331.4 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 0.01           
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Table 4: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS AND EXTENSION: DELAY 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
Dependent variable 
Tobit: Cashback 
payment in the prior 
two weeks 
Tobit: Cashback 
payment in the prior 
four weeks 
Tobit: No long delays 
Tobit: Only 
observations with 
cashback payments > 0 
Tobit: Extension: 
Cashback payment and 
delay 
Log(Amount spent in the week 
($)) Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE 
 
Independent variables                
Cashback payment ($) 0.0023 0.0003 *** 0.0022 0.0002 *** 0.0029 0.0004 *** 0.0009 0.0004 **    
Cashback payment ($) when 
delay < 76 days             0.0040 0.0008 *** 
Cashback payment ($) when 
delay ≥ 76 and < 112 days             0.0029 0.0006 *** 
Cashback payment ($) when 
delay ≥ 112 days             0.0002 0.0007  
Average cashback offer (%) of 
top 10 retailers in the current 
week 
0.1653 0.0346 *** 0.1640 0.0346 *** 0.1614 0.0348 *** 0.1779 0.0967 * 0.1712 0.0344 *** 
Amount spent in the most recent  
purchase ($) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0001 0.0000 *** 0.0006 0.0000 *** 
Purchase instance 0.0027 0.0003 *** 0.0026 0.0003 *** 0.0027 0.0003 *** 0.0080 0.0005 *** 0.0029 0.0003 *** 
Consumer heterogeneity RE RE RE RE RE 
Month fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of consumers 5,000 5,000 5,000 3,974 5,000 
N 640,784 640,784 640,784 56,019 640,784 
LL -621657.43 -621634.14 -616501.05 -75347.03 -620789.87 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 0.01     
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Table 5: EXTENSION: RETAILER CATEGORY ANALYSIS 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
  
Tobit: General retailer 
category Tobit: Travel category Tobit: Services category Tobit: Publishing category 
Tobit: Single General-
category retailer Dependent Variable 
Log (amount spent in the week ($)) Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE  
Independent Variables                
Cashback payment from same retailer 
category($)  0.0045 0.0007 *** 0.0023 0.0013 * -0.0082 0.0024 *** -0.0101 0.0038 *** .0078 0.0003 *** 
Cashback payment from all other 
retailer categories ($)  0.0029 0.0010 *** 0.0001 0.0011  -0.0002 0.0018  -0.0032 0.0013 ** 0.0014 0.0005 ** 
Average cashback offer (%) of all 
retailers of same category in the 
current week 
6.4217 0.4102 *** 4.5943 0.6481 *** -0.7482 0.2917 ** -0.5436 0.2718 **    
Cashback offer (%) of the individual 
retailer             0.9881 0.0387 *** 
Amount spent in the most recent 
purchase ($)  -0.0002 0.0000 *** 0.0006 0.0000 *** 0.0007 0.0000 *** -0.0003 0.0000 *** -0.0002 0.0000 *** 
Purchase instance 0.0001 0.0001  -0.0011 0.0002 *** -0.0006 0.0003 ** -0.0012 0.0002 *** -0.0004 0.0001 *** 
Consumer heterogeneity RE   RE   RE   RE   RE   
Monthly fixed effect Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes   
Number of consumers 5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   3,863   
N 589,240   427,313   454,340   324,603   486,994   
LL -503,525.95   -208,860.06   -134,400.22    -95,353.85    -221423.66  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 0.01                          
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Table 6: CASHBACK PAYMENTS: SPENDING VS. SAVING 
 (I) (II) 
Dependent variable OLS Fractional logit 
Percentage of cashback payment saved Estimate SE   Estimate SE  
       
Independent variables       
Cashback payment of $3 - -  - -  
Cashback payment of $7 3.1034 1.7038 * 0.2341 0.1370 * 
Cashback payment of $18 5.4149 1.7038 *** 0.4140 0.1288 *** 
Cashback payment of $54 15.5083 1.7050 *** 1.1362 0.1249 *** 
Cashback payment of $113 22.5465 1.7027 *** 1.6394 0.1238 *** 
Cashback payment of $162 23.3308 1.7038 *** 1.6821 0.1235 *** 
Cashback payment of $287 26.1542 1.7027 *** 1.8953 0.1294 *** 
Age 1.3534 0.7113 * 0.0632 0.0261 ** 
Male -10.0000 13.5147  -15.7248 3.9702 *** 
Income <$25,000 - -  - -  
Income $25,000-$50,000 58.5714 13.5147 *** 3.2787 0.8311 *** 
Income $50,000-$75,000 -32.6316 14.6983 ** -1.5394 0.4828 *** 
Income $75,000-$100,000 2.8195 11.7095  0.1444 0.5371  
Income >$100,000 -16.6541 18.4665   -16.0226 2.5748 *** 
Respondent fixed effects Yes     Yes   
Number of respondents 441   441   
N  3,087     3,087   
LL    -1264.18   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 0.01       
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Table 7: EVIDENCE FOR BEHAVIORAL MECHANISM 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Dependent variable Tobit: First week of the month 
Tobit: Last week of the 
month 
Tobit: Three-way split of 
shopping frequency 
Tobit: Five-way split of 
shopping frequency 
Log (amount spent in the week) ($) Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE   Estimate SE   
Independent variables             
Cashback payment during the first week of the month 0.0026 0.0007 ***          
Cashback payment during other weeks of the month 0.0025 0.0005 ***          
Cashback payment during the last week of the month    0.0020 0.0010 **       
Cashback payment during other weeks of the month    0.0026 0.0004 ***       
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time 
 < 19.08 days       0.0002 0.0015     
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time  
≥ 19.08 and < 42.68 days        0.0013 0.0009     
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time 
 ≥ 42.68 days       0.0030 0.0005 ***    
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time 
 < 12.95 days           -0.0017 0.0023  
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time 
≥ 12.95 and < 22.03 days          0.0016 0.0016  
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time  
≥ 22.03 and < 35.69 days          0.0021 0.0011 * 
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time 
 ≥ 35.69 and < 64.28 days           0.0034 0.0010 *** 
Cashback payment to consumers with average inter-purchase time  
≥ 64.28 days           0.0027 0.0005 *** 
Average cashback offer (%) of top 10 retailers in the current week 0.1662 0.0346 *** 0.1668 0.0347 *** 0.1662 0.0346 *** 0.1663 0.0346 *** 
Amount spent in the most recent purchase ($)  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000  
Purchase instance 0.0027 0.0003 *** 0.0027 0.0003 *** 0.0027 0.0003 *** 0.0027 0.0003 *** 
Consumer heterogeneity RE     RE   RE   RE     
Month fixed effect Yes     Yes   Yes   Yes     
Number of consumers 5,000     5,000   5,000   5,000     
N 640,784     640,784   640,784   640,784     
LL -621669.77  -621669.6  -621667.1  -621667.4   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p 0.01                         
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Figure 1: DELAY BETWEEN PURCHASE AND CASHBACK PAYMENT 
 
 
 
Figure 2: DELAY FOR FOUR RANDOMLY SELECTED CONSUMERS 
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Figure 3: DELAY AT FOUR RANDOMLY-SELECTED RETAILERS 
 
 
 
Figure 4: DELAY FOR FOUR RANDOMLY-SELECTED UNMATCHED CONSUMERS 
AT A SPECIFIC RETAILER 
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Figure 5: DELAY FOR FOUR RANDOMLY-SELECTED MATCHED  
CONSUMERS AT A SPECIFIC RETAILER 
 
 
 
Figure 6:  DELAY AT A MUSIC RETAILER AND AT A  
GENERAL RETAILER 
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Figure 7: MODEL-FREE EVIDENCE FOR PURCHASE LIKELIHOOD 
 
 
Figure 8: MODEL-FREE EVIDENCE FOR SPENDING 
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Figure 9: MARGINAL EFFECT OF CASHBACK PAYMENT ON OBSERVED SPEND,  
BY TERCILE OF CASHBACK PAYMENT 
  
